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SUNDAY OPENING OF THE WORLD'S FAIR-SOME LEGAL
ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION.'
THE question of a Sunday fair has at last been taken
to the courts. Unlike most similar controversies of interest
to the public, this one may involve legal questions of no
inconsiderable difficulty, and of great importance to the
future development of law. In this note we shall discuss
two questions which, among many others, the facts of the
case seem to present.
In the last days of the first session of the Fifty-second
Congress, Congress passed an Act' appropriating two and
one-half millions worth of one-half dollat coins, stamped in
a manner emblematic of the Exposition and Columbus, to
the World's Columbian Exposition,. a corporation of the
State of Illinois. Section 4 of the Act provides that the
appropriation is made on Condition that the Fair will be
closed on Sunday. "That itis hereby declared that all
appropriations herein made for, or pertaining to, the World's
Columbian Exposition, are made upon the .condition that
the said Exposition shall not be open to the public on the
first day of the week, commonly called Sunday; and if the
said appropriations be accepted by the corporation of the
State of Illinois, known as the World's Columbian 4xposition, upon that condition, it shall be, and it is hereby made
the duty of the World's Columbian Commission created by
the Act of Congress of April twenty-fifth, eighteen hundred and ninety, to make such rules or modification of the
rules of said corporation as shall requirethe closing of the
Exposition on the first day of the week, commonly called
Sunday.

IThe following note was written before the decision of the court.
The text of the opinion has not reached us, and, therefore, we are unable
to state the reasons given by the court for its reversal.
2Statutes. Vol. XXVII, p. 389, chap. 381.
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. The thing which naturally first impressed the country
was that the Exposition Corporation, 'having received a benefit under the appropriation, are now trying to evade one of
tMe conditions upon which that benefit was conferred.
But there is, in reality, a prior question of interest,
not only in this connection, but in all disputes between the
Commissioners and the Managers of the Columbian Exposition Corporation.
Irresfiective of/he afifiropHriation,has .Congressthe control of the regulationsin relation to the ofieration of the Fair
to any extent, and if so, would a law closing the Fair on
Sunday be a legal exercise offiower on the part of Congress .?
In 'answer to this question, it may first be admitted
that Congress has the right to hold, under its sole direction,
a national fair. Again, it may be admitted that Congress
could constitutionally aid a private fair, i. e., one created
by .private enterprise and subscription, and under private
control. Also, Congress, since it can create a national
fair, can employ a corporation of its own creation, or
confer upon a'State corporation the power to create a
national fair.
But the power to aid, because the private enterprise is
also a national public purpose, is not the power to regulate
the private enterprise.
For instance, it may, for the
purpose of illustration, be admitted that Congress has the
right to run a manufacturing establishment of its own,
dr give a bounty to the manufacturer of certain goods.
Probably the majority of constitutional lawyers would
admit that the Federal government has this power. But
none would contend that Congress could regulate the process
of manufacture or the rates of wages all over the country.
Again, the admission that Congress, to encourage marriages,
can give a bounty to all persons who are married at a
certain age, does not imply that Congress can pass divorce
or succession laws for the United States. Because Congress, therefore, may run its own fair, or has the right to
aid fairs, it does not follow that Congress can regulate such
fairs when managed by private individuals.
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On the other hand, there is no doubt that Congress
can aid on conditions; can grant bounties, if they -can
giant them at all, or aid fairs, coupled with the condition
that the recipient of the favor should thereafter submit to
Federal regulations in certain directions. How far this
species of legislation can be carried is a matter of doubt.
Had, therefore, the World's Columbian Exposition, the
corporation of the State of Illinois, accepted favors from the "
United States prior to the Act of August 5, i892, on the
express or implied condition of submitting to future legislation on the part of Congress?
The main Act relating to the World's Fair is that of
April 25, 189o.'

The Act declares that there shall be. an

Exposition in Chicago. A commission is provided, to be
called the World's Columbian Commission. This Commission, among other things, has the right to accept or rejedt
the site offered by the Exposition Corporation of I1linois,
but can only accept the same if the Corporation of Illinois
has a certain portion of its capital stock paid in, aid a
larger portion subscribed. itis further provided that the
Commission "shall allot space for exhibitors, prepare a
classification of exhibits, determine the plan and scope of
the work, etc., etc." Section 7 reads: "That after the
plans for said exposition shall be prepared by said Corporation, and approved by said Commission, all the rules for
governing rates for entrance and admission fees, or otherwise affecting the rights, privileges or interests of exhibitors, or of the public, shall be fixed or established by said
corporation, subject, however, to such modification, if any, as

may be imposed by a majority of said commissioners."
The remainder of the Act is taken up with provisions concerning official notice to foreign governments as soon as the
Corporation of Illinois shall be in solvent financial condi.
tion, the government exhibit at the Fair, etc. The sum
and substance of this Act of 189o is that if a certain corporation of the State of Illinois is in a good financial condition to carry on a World's Fair, then the United States
I Statutes, Vol. xxvi, p. 62, chap. 156.
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would exhibit at the Fair, give it ,a national aspect before
foreign nations, provided always the regulation in regard
to scope of the Fair and its management should be supervised by 'a commission created by the Federal government.
The'Corporation of Illinois by co-operation with the cornmissioners accepted these conditions.
There are two questions in regard to the nature of
these conditions. The first is whether valid regulations to
be made by the government are confined to the CommisI sion, provision for the creation of which is 'made by the
Act, or whether Congress can dictate to its own commission
the regulations which it desires enforced. This question,
should the Court discuss it, will be probably ans'~ered in
faizor of Congress. The Commission is the creation of the
Federal government. Its members do not form a separate
corporation. They are part of the administrative or executive force of the government Their acts are the acts of
the government of the United States. Since it was impossible that Congress should superintend the arrangements of

'the Fair they delegated that executive work to the Commission; but it seems reasonable to assume that Congress
can change the personnel, of the Commission, or direct its
work, or correct or add to its regulations for the conduct of
the Fair, and that when the Corporation of Illinois, in
return for the official patronage of the government, allowed
the government to superintend the regulations of the Fair
they did not confine themselves to regulations imposed by
the particular people first chosen by the President to act on
the Commission, or even to the Commission at all, but to
the government of the United States.
Granting, therefore, for the purpose of discussion, that
Congress has power to superintend the rules enacted by
the Corporation, because of the acceptance of the Act of
April 25, i89o, let us examine for a moment the second
and mbre difficult question: "Whether closing the Fair
on Sunday is such a regulation as was contemplated by
the government or the corporation when the Fair commenced ?"
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This is a question whose answer at most can only be
guessed at, before a decision by the court. There is no
doubt that, while the United States can regulate the running
of the Fair, they cannot destroy it. The only regulations
which the Corporation could have had in view, when they
submitted to the provisions of the Act of i89o, were regulations which should be enacted by the United States in
good faith. Was the Sunday closing section of the Act of
1892 passed for the benefit of the Fair? This is a question
on which two opinions can be held. On one side it can be
contended that the Act was not for the benefit of the Fair,
but-in obedience to the religious sentiment of the people;
that the success or failure of the Fair as such had nothing
to do with it. On the other hand, it can be urged that this
very religious sentiment was proof to Congress that the
Fair could not be a success unless this sentiment was'
deferred to; that acting against the Sentiment would cause'
many people to stay away from the Fair. Besides, giving,
the employees one day's rest in seven may well be ,considered necessary to enable them to perform their duties on
the other six.
From a legal standpoint, we should say that -the first
was a more convincing argument. Whatever the merits
of "Sunday closing," all must admit the Act was passed
regardless of the interest of the World's Columbian Corporation, as a corporation, for the making of money by
conducting a fair.
Granting, then, for a moment that the United State'
government could not, without the consent of the Fair
corporation, close the same on Sunday, has the government
acquired the right to have the Fairclosed as a result of the
approhriationOf 1892 and the acceptanceof the benefit of/'hat
aplbrojbrialionby the cor-boration? If the Fair had received

the whole appropriation we should say unhesitatingly,
Yes. As it is, however, it is at least a debatable question.
The United States, by withholding part of the appropriation, has, it seems to us, placed herself in the position of
a plaintiff who asks for the enforcement of a contract with-
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out being able to allege that her own part has been fulfilled.
Besides, there may be a question that those who donated
moiiey to the Fair corporation before Congress appropriated
the money, did so with the, understanding that the Fair
should ndt be closed. Grant, however, for the sake of
discussing the really interesting- point in the case, that
Congress has so far lived up to its part of the agreement
and the benefit has been received on the express condition
that the Fair should be closed. The commission was
directed to make such a regulation. The corporation
could have refused the benefit. They did not do so.
The ambiguity which would arise from the terms "if the
said appropriation be accepted . .

.

upon that condition,"

which, if standing alone, might mean that the condition
was not obligatory, is dispelled by the positive words in
the rest of the section. Granting, then,, that the United
States government has a right to have the Fair cl6sed, can
it enforce this right in the courts by injunction compelling
specific petformance of the condition? or is the government
relegated to a common law action for damages?
From a purely legal standpoint the interest in the case
lies mainly in the proper answer to this question: If our
remedial and our substantive law had not been the result
of slow growth and development, but had sprung perfect
from the brain of some. lawgiver, the law would probably
provide that every right capable of being enforced by a
court would be enforced-and what so easy to enforce as
negative covenants ?. But our law has been a progressive
growth, and we wisely sacrifice some improvements which
legislature could make to its preservation as a growing
and developing science. Be that as it may, the common
law never pretended to secure persons in rights which had
vested, but only to vest the right to money, i. e., give
.pecuniary damages to one deprived of a right. This was,
at best, but a crude administration of justice, and was one
of the causes of the growth of the Court of Chancery.
Wherever damages for the loss of a vested right were
manifestly inadequate compensation to the person whose
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right was taken away, then the Court of Chancery enforced
the revesting of the right.
But, on the other hand,
wherever damages were sufficient compensation, then the
mere existence of a right, and the ability of the Court if it
choose to secure the right, would not be sufficient to call
forth action on the part of the Court of Equity.
The specific perforimance of a contract. to sell a: particular piece of real estate is constantly enjoined, originally,
perhapsi because the particular land may have a peculiar
value to the vendee not to be compensated for in damages.'
On the other hand, the specific performance of a contract
to convey personal property is not always enforced when,
the prop!erty in question, like a share of stock, is similar
to any other of the same kind which may be bought with'
money damages on the market.'
In Phillips v. Berger,3 EDMONDS, J.,.plahes the whole
question in a very clear light. Speaking of the distinction -between contracts to convey per onal property and"
those to convey real estate, he says: "The reason of the
distinction between the two classes of eases has long Sinco
passed away. Yet the distinction still in a great measure
remains: Judge STdRY, with great propriety, in his
"Commefitaries on Equity Jurisprudence," remarks. that
there is no reasonable objection to allowing the party who
is injured by the breach to have an election either to take
damages at law, or to have a specific performance in equity.
The courts have not gone that length, but when they do
they will relieve the subject of specific performance of
'Judge HARu, in his note to White&Tudor's Leading Casesin Equity,
p. 1095 says: Specific Performance of, "Contracts for real estate will
generally be decreed, because there is nothing of special value in every
piece of land."
2 Cuddee z. Rutter, 5 Vin. Ab., 538, W. & T. Lead. Cas., Hare, io63.
There is considerable difference between the United States and England
in this respect. In the latter country the development of the powers of
equity by the courts has been much more rapid, especially in relation to
the power to issue injunctions, than with us. The development, in this
respect, being considerably assisted by the Act of 21 and 22 Vict., c. 27,
commonly known as Lord CAIRNs' Act.
3 2 Barbour, S. Ct., 6o9. See also 8 Id., 527.
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many of its embarrassments and remove from this branch
of equity jurisprudence many of the artificial distinctions
to which the courts are compelled to have recourse in order
to justify their advance toward a sound general rule."
There are some cases, as that of Cuddee v. Rutter,
where damages are completely compensatory. But the
right reason for refusing the request for specific performance seems to us to be that the paymeit of the money

is a perfornahce of the contract, it *being implied in all
contracts for the conveyance of stock which can be bought
on the market that the payment of the money value of the
stock fulfills the contract. In fact, it was first thought
that the conveyance of personal property to the rightful
owner would only be enforced when there was some peculiar value which might be attached to the particular property. .'Slowly, but surely, however, and, as is stated in the
note, more rapidly in England than with us, the position
of equity is changing, until, let us hope, it will soon be
able to be said of the administration of law that the specific vesting of rights to chattels, as well as rights to land,
except in the case of money, will be *enforced in equity.
Money, of course, is an exception. - If A owes B money,
damages to the full amount of the debt, with interest, and
further damages if the circumstances warrant it, is always
amply compensatory for non-payment of the money on a
particular day.
The rights of individuals are not confined to the physical pbssession of land or goods. If A. B. promises C. D.,
on a sufficient consideration, not to enter into a certain
trade in a certain town, provided the contract is not against
public policy, the right of C. D. not to have A. B. in the
business is as much a right as the right to do with his
tangible property what he will. It is a right whose
vesting will be enforced in a court of equity, because the
loss of the vested right cannot be properly estimated in
damages.
In this case the Exposition Corporation has denied to
the United States Government a right which, on our

